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THE ROLE: OF THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
An elected official can hardly expect universal approval of his 
position on every issue. Almost invariably some people will agree ·~th 
him and others will disagree, sometimes very vehemently. And I must 
say that a Member of Congress pricked by public criticism bleeds at 
least as profusely as any other human being . 
In a decade and a half of service in Congress , I have been on 
sick call for this reason on a number of occasions. I have learned to 
accept occasional wounds as a part of my job, as an occupational hazard. 
There is one issue , however, which I have repeatedly tackled in 
Congress and have repeatedly come out, not licking my wounds, but 
miraculously unscathed. That issue is the preservation of the integrity 
of the Marine Corps. 
While Members of Congress must , out of conviction, sometimes run 
counter to the immediate flow of public opinion, it is not a very 
pleasant experience . It is always preferable, if you can do so honestly, 
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to find yourself fl~Jing downstream vith public s nt nt rather thnn 
truggling upstrcac, half-drowned, against it. 
Beyond the natural gratification vhich co~s to an elect d official 
vhcn he finds his ovn heart and the public pulse beating in perfect 
unison - - beyond that, I have a special pleasure in fighting for the 
integrity of t he Corps . 
OJ~I 
As a• e• aeaee1, I tak personal pride in the 
Marines. Of course, I also take personal pride in the Arcy and the Navy, 
as an ex-member of each of those Services . But I think I ooy be pardoned 
if I tend to be a l ittle prouder of my Marine background . I vas only a 
r~~ 
private in the Army. I vas only an or~ltU•lfY seamanr-,in the r;avy . But vith 
that same percept i veness vhich prompted the Murine Corps to recognize your 
qualities of leader ship , the Corps also recognized mine . I emerged from 
{'FC . 
my hitch in the Marines as a ~~vai~ fi~e\ a1 ess 
That distinction, I realize , does not, in itself, qualify me to speak 
to you on "The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy ." IleverthA-
less, I feel that the subject is of such great importance that it should 
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Jr.~rlv 
be considered not only by privates -- qpdipa~ or first class -- and 
Senators 1 but by thoughtful Americans throughout the nation . I think 
it is an especially pertinent one for you men who are graduating today 
into command positions in the Corps. The Marines have traditionally 
operated with high effectiveness as a principal military instrument of 
this nation's foreign policy during peacetime just as they have more than 
once proved their tremendous capabilities when the peace has been violated . 
One explanation for this outstanding service may well be that the 
Corps has always maintained a strict professional regard for the American 
principle of civilian control of military power. That principle, as I am 
sure you have been taught , is absolutely essential for the proper function -
ing of our system of government . It is not enoughf that Congress determines 
appropriations and organizational arrangements, and that the President and 
his civilian assistants direct the administrative management of the military . 
The American concept goes further . It requires that the military shall 
only be used whenever, wherever, and in whatever manner the politically 
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r ponsible civ only t 
hip, through 1 ctions, can b h ld c. countable to tb pcop 
nation. 
()./ 
In t pr s nt tate of vorld c.ffairo, ~ 
of th 
is not easily maintained . It is subject to all the str ss s and strain 
that arise from the tense international situation . In a crisis, vith th 
threat of vorld conflict ever present, it is not unnatural to turn to 
distinguished military leaders for guidance, to rely h avily on their 
judgment, and sometimes it is profitable to the nation to do so. lleverthc-
less, the principle of civilian control remains essential to democratic 
government as ve knov it . 
Primary responsibility for the preservation of this principle rests 
vith our civilian leadership; that leadership must be villing to assume 
the heavy responsibilities of decision in this dangerou vorld. But I 
think you vill agree that considerable responsibility also rests vith the 
military. They must understand and accept the limits as vell as the 
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challenges of their profession in the conduct of the nation's affairs , 
particularly its foreign affairs . 
Perhaps I can illustrate this point with an anecdote . During the 
Civil War, the story goes, certain Members of Congress left their desks 
in Washington and went to the battlefields in Virginia . There, they 
insisted upon assuming the tactical command of the Union forces. After 
having thrown the campaign into confusion, they beat a hasty retreat to 
Washington where they arrived mud-spattered, trembling, and presumably 
chastised. 
If the story is amusing, it is because it is easy to recognize the 
absurdity of this escapade . These Congressmen apparently assumed that 
their training in politics equipped them to run the Army. They also 
distorted and distended the functions of their office out of all true 
proportion. 
The moral of the story is simple enough: Congressmen ought not to 
assume that political training provides an automatic background for 
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military leadership and, in military affairs , th ir rol ought not to 
exceed the constitutional pavers of their office. 
IP-t us put the shoe on the other foot. The coral is nov this : 
Military leaders ought not to assume that militcry training provides an -
autocatic background for politics , whether national or international, and 
they ought not in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy exceed the -
pavers of their appointive office . 
Just as the distorted behavior of the Congressmen in the Civil War 
could have produced tragic results as easily as humorous, so too can the 
distorted behavior of military leaders . 
It has never been easy to draw a clear line as to the area of compe-
tence and authority of the Armed Services in foreign policy. Events of 
the past 15 years have made it even more difficult . First of all , during 
th i e period, some among us , civilian and military alike, have developed a 
distorted sense of the nature of what this country is trying to do in its 
relations vith other nations and how it can most effectively go about doing 
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it . Foreign policy is simply the course by which we attempt to provide 
for the safety of the nation and the advancement of its interests in a 
complex and dangerous world. That is its only reason for being. To 
~
carry out our policy we require military strength but we must also bring 
into play nonmilitary instruments and measures to influence conditions 
throughout the world. Possibly it is because these nonmilitary measures 
are less dramatic , less newsworthy, and tend to affect us and our families 
less directly, that we sometimes lose our perspective and regard them as 
less important t han military actions . Sometimes there is a tendency to view 
nonmilitary measures merely as supplements of our military policy1 when in 
fact the reverse is closer to thetruth. 
You men need hardly to be reminded of this fact . If you know the 
history of the Corps, you know that the Marines have been sent to foreign 
territories and to overseas bases only from time to time and only after the 
~
failure of other methods to protect American citizens and interests. In 
countless day-to-day situations arising in our foreign relations throughout 
the world the military instrument is in no way involved. 
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As f r lu s~l u of fore 1 it i i 
ures fai to p~oduce situation favor ble to the vita curity 
int r st of th United States, thnt uch u csy bee~ n c 
v n th n v hav invoked military force only in r ponce to nggr s ion. 
That ve have waited for our enemy to ohov b yond all shadow of doubt that 
he intends to strike us , rather than strike the first blow ourselves, docs 
not mean that ~e are slow-witted or even patient. It menno simply that 
we are following a fundamental ~erican principle: that force is the 
final , not the first arbiter in the affairs of men nnd nations. Nothing ........ 
has done more to toughen the moral fiber of this count~J than that principl . 
No other single factor has served to sustain our morale during the long and 
gruelling waro which we have had to fight . Nothing has done more to turn 
the hearts and hopes of mankind to this nation. And I hope the dny never 
comes when thi~ nation shall use its micht in any way other than for 
protection against the urogant, the aggressive, and the ruthless. 
The role of the military in foreign policy, then, is to provide a r s rv 
of pawer to support negotiations concerning our just interests in the vorld 
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and to defend those interests if they are attacked. I vant to underline 
the vords reserve and support . Responsibility for determining vhat our 
interests are and vhen and hov they are to be defended is vested in the 
President and his Secretary of State . The Department of Defense and 
other agencies of the government , in the per formance of their duties have 
an influence in this determination, but final responsibility cannot rest 
~
in any body other than the Department of State or the President himself . 
Since the beginning of World War II, hovever, the role of the military 
in American foreign policy has assumed proportions of great magnitude . 
During the var the Armed Services inevitably became the foremost element 
in carrying out American policy . Since the close of those hostilities the 
Services have continued to serve prominently in this connection, due to the 
nature of postwar diplomacy and developments . 
The occupation of Germany and Japan, and the control of trust territories, 
among other things, has brought the Armed Services directly into foreign 
policy to a degree unpree~dented in peacetime . To some extent, the 
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the vas true of the r;o-col d Tn.u:1nn Doctrin of 1 7. Uruier t:h 
Trucan Doctrine, the ~d Forces not only ron military training m1 io 
to strengthen the security of Greece and Turkey against C~n1 t aggression, 
but of necessity played a significant role in the formulation of policJ 
vith respect to thooe countrieo. Subsequently, they have had on eno~ou 
influence in foreign policy in connection vith NA-~, nutunl aid and cilitary 
assistance missions in numerous countries, the Korean var, overseas boocs, 
and treaties vith nations in the Western Pacific . 
I think that one ct the chief problems emanating fr~ this chain of 
developments is that in many instances there has been a tendency to trent 
individual military programs and po]Cies os separate and distinct military 
affairs , vhereas they actually arc parts of the totality of American foreign 
policy . ~esponsibility for decision-making has at times been vested in 
military officials rather than in foreign policy officials . In other 
instances there has been a failure to define and clarify lines of responei-
bility for policy forculation . I say this, not so much in criticims as in 
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recognition of the fact . It is unlikely that anyone planned it that way; 
it has simply happened -- perhaps largely because it was not planned. 
The obscuring of the lines or responsibility and authority is perhaps 
best illustrated in the issuance of public statements by leaders of the 
Armed Services. Such statements are usually expressed in military termi-
nology . Orten, however, much of their substance is of a foreign policy 
nature. Perhaps this is unavoidable in view of the complexity or the 
matters with which they frequently deal. One cannot always draw a clear-
cut line between military and political and other factors in a given situation . 
The question of rearming Germany will serve to illustrate this point, 
and this example finds a counterpart in practically everyother major foreign 
policy issue with which we are confronted. There are strong military 
reasons for urging the rearmament of Germany and it is natural for military 
personnel to see the need in terms of added divisions of manpo~er, bases and 
so forth . But Germany cannot be rearmed in a vacuum. Rearmament cannot be 
divorced from a whole range of problems concerning European Unity, the fears 
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of Fr nee , t rol of Britain on th cont1n nt, tb of 
Gf'rmo.ny, nd th t:lll.1nt na.ncc of the tern Alli nc . It to I 
therefore, t t official state nts on this of 
government emnnntc best fro:n our for ign policy official . They rc p 
sumnbly kept vcll informed by th Joint Chiefs of Staff vith rc pcct to 
the military consideration involved nd they in turn arc beGt quip~~ 
to viev such considerations and to express them public y in t rmG of th 
totality of Am~rican interests . 
I cite this example merely to illustrate the problem of d fining th 
role o~ the military in American foreign policy . It is not difficult to 
see the principal reason for the expansion of military participation in for ign 
policy making . As I mentioned earli r , the nature of varttme and postwar 
developments and diplomacy has required a vastly increased uoe of the ~ili-
tary as an instrument of policy. 
There is, hovev r 1 still anoth~r factor. The military emerged froc the 
var with great prentige 1 both at home and abroad, and this prestige has 
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carried over into the postwar period. On the international scene this 
has led to widespread use of prominent military leaders in diplomatic 
capacities. At various periods since the close of World War II three of 
our foremost military leaders during the war have served in positions 
which were more political than military and which roughly corresponded 
to their wartime military roles - - General Eisenhower as NATO commander, 
General MacArthur in charge of the occupation of Japan, and General 
Marshall as Secretary of State. Each of these distinguished mili tary 
leaders had earned the respect of foreign nations, as well as the American 
people, through their outstanding military service. Each made an exceptional 
contribution in their postwar assignments . 
other military leaders have also been called upon for diplomatic or 
political services -- General dalter Bedell Smith, who served as Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Under-
secretary of State, and Admiral Alan Kirk, who served as Ambassador to Belgium 
and Ambassador to the Soviet Union, are two leading examples . I could name 
two dozen other former generals and admirals now holding civilian positions in 
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th~ Federal Gov r~nt. Countle other of field grad rc catter d 
through the civilian bureaucraci s of th~ Federal Gov rncent concern d ~ th 
foreign affaire and international organizations. 
This increased usc of military leaders in position of a diplocatic 
or political nature , of course, bas often been due not only to a cnrry-ov r 
of the military prestige of these men, but also to their d m onstrated 
ability as vell as their availability for such service. 
~ 
Withou~any way reflecting on the capacity of any individual I do think 
that the vast expansion in the ecployment of military pcroonnal in both the 
making nnd carrying out of foreign policy is s~ething to vbich ve should 
give some serious thought. It raises questions not only vith respect to 
our basic values , but also with respect to our basic foreign policy objec-
tives, including our military security . 
First, let me say something about the question vhich I think this trend 
poses concerning our basic values. 
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Military officers are not different from anyone else in this country. 
(t it., 0fJ'f • I 
They come from representative families all over the cg'"'*.,.• They go to 
the same grade schools and high schools . They hold the same social and 
religious values . But the military profession exacts from those who 
pursue it a higher measure of self-sacrifice in the public interest than 
·most other professions. The military as a group must accept a higher degree -
of training, conditioning, and disciplining toward one objective : to provide 
military protection for the Nation . That is as it should be and those who 
enter the profession, like you men today, understand these conditions . 
Like any other professional group the military in their dedication to 
their primary objectiv~ may tend to lose sight of other national objectives . 
It appears to me , consequently, that when the military in fact make policy 
decisions or when military techniques are excessively applied to carry out 
policies which can be more appropriately handled by civilian techniques, we 
are in danger of having military objectives and values emphasized at the 
expense of other, broader national objectives and values. 
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With respect to our basic :foreign po y ob ti J 1 -Udi 1 
curity it lf, the xpan ion of th militnr~y rol in for polic) po 
nom more ~diete dangers. R pon ibility for our ntirc for 1gn pol1c. 1 
vbich is concerned vith 1nt rnational econacic, cultural and politic 1 
relations, as vell as ~ith military affairs , io v oted in our ccretary o:f 
~tate. Our military objectives have no ceaning in themselves exc pt a 
th~y tend to further our nonmilitary objectives . l:f they are given an 
independent menning, if they become ends in th mnelves , ve could easily be 
led into costly adventures which would only add to the financial and bucan 
burdens of the American people and which might ultimately result in wide-
spread public reaction against the military . The best way to avoid a 
distorted emphasis on milita1~ objectives, the way that is provided under 
our constitutional system, 1s to require tl~t final authority in foreign 
policy decision-making remain unequivocally vith the Secretary of state 
under the President of the United Staten. 
In terms of our military security ~pecifically, as dist1ngu1 h~d free 
the vider range of foreign policy, it appears to me that a fUrther danger 
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exists . Our military experts may weaken their professional stature through 
over-anxious acceptance of an increased role in policy matters. 
In recent years military leaders have been brought into the lime-light 
of public discussions of foreign policy largely as a result of their well-
earned public prestige. Civilian political leaders have tended to rely 
heavily on this prestige gained through military accomplishments in order 
to support policies affecting our foreign policy. Generals and Admirals 
have been called upon or sent to testify regularly before Congressional 
Committees, not only in connection with military appropriations and matters 
affecting the individual services , but also in connection with broad issues 
of policy, such as economic assistance programs and international alliances. 
Military officials, moreover, frequently discuss political issues -- not 
necessarily partisan political issues, but issues of a political nature - -
at public appearances and press conferences. I ~y say at this point that the 
Marin~ Corps has been singularly free of this type of affliction. To the 
best of my knowledge , the leadership of the Corps has successfully resisted 
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the tecptation to assert its expertnc s v rbc.l. y c.nd pub icly not only 
in Clilitary natters but over the vhole ra.D8e of human aff ire . Only n 
elected official, constantly beckoned by the siren-call of th pre s , 
radio, and television, can appreciate the extraordinary d gree of self-
control that thio represents . It is one more reason for mA to be proud of 
my personal connection with the Corps . 
Nov v'ho.t is the danger to our security inherent in the exposure of 
military leaders - - whether sought or unsought - - to the political conflicts 
of the day? I t is this; military leaders who are so exposed vill find th m-
selves in agreement vith one side of a political issue and at odds vith the 
other . They vill be applauded by political leaders vhose position they up-
hold and looked upon vith suspicion by their opponents . When military 
officers become subjects of partisan politics they are no longer vieved as 
ucbiased, objective career- servants, nor vill their military judgcents be 
accepted as those of politically-disinterested professional experts . From 
that , it is only one step to the loss of confidence in the cilitary judgment 
of our military leaders . 
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This central problem was clearly illustrated prior to the last 
presidential election when a Senator publicly called for a change in the 
membership of the Joint Chiefs of' Staff. lie had, he said1 "lost confidence" 
in their judgment . The new administration, moreover, subsequently did 
appoint a ne11 Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a "new look" at the military 
program. Surely we cannot have Republican generals and admirals for one 
administration and Democratic generals and admirals for the next Without 
danger to the national security. 
Now, possibly as never before, we cannot afford to play politics with 
our security. No political party, and no faction of a party, stands in 
the long-run to benefit from military insecurity in this country . Certainly, 
the Armed Services as a whole do not. 
In mentioning this tendency of some military officers to slip into 
or to be drawn into the political orbit of our system of gover~nt, I do 
not wish to imply that the military experts should have no contact uith 
Congress . Certainly Congress has a right to know what our military experts 
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11 1 not in thi , but in mi~itery oftic rs b ns ploy d xpert 
outsid the area of their special competence in support of or oppo tion 
to policy ~tterc concerning vhich politic 1 end not military d ci ion mu t 
b mad • 
Th re is no cacy solution to this problem . Part of the ensv r lie~ in 
the r straint vhich civilian leaders must x rei c to avoid placing military 
officials on the spot i~ political issues . Part of the answer cust also lie 
in the fortitude with vh:ch military leaders r sist the temptation to pro-
ject themselves into no~ilitary questions . 
This problem may seem renote to you men n~-, but within a sho~ span of 
years as your careers unfold it msy vell become for so~ of you a most 
pressing and difficult one . 
As I mentioned earlier, respo~sibility for maintaining the proper 
civilian-military balance in our system of governrrent cust be shared by both 
our military leaders and our civilian political leadership . The military 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 48, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 21 -
must exercise the utmost restraint in policy matters , and our civilian 
leadership must be willing to take full responsibility for political 
decisions . 
In foreign relations we need constantly to keep in mind the essential 
relationship of military force to total foreign policy . Military leaders 
as well as civilian foreign policy officials must understand the supporting 
role of military force . Military resources, like other tools of foreign 
policy, must be available to l our politically accountable civilian policy 
makers when, where , and under conditions prescribed by those policy makers. 
It is incumbent upon our policy makers that they should take full advantage 
of military advice, but when the time for decision-making comes the civilian 
policy maker must make the choice and take full responsibllity for that 
choice . 
How can we preserve this principle, and at the same time provide for 
our own military security? There are no hard and fast rules . There is only 
common sense and a few guideposts appropriate to the present state of world 
affairs . 
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tr ngth to A t the threat of coc=uni t cggrc ion. 
At the same tit:le , ho-.,.ever, every effort should b cad to us non-
military m asures to conduct foreign policy vherevcr possible . Thy nr 
leso costly, and often they can produce beneficial recults that nrc more 
lnDting in their effects . If ve are to pursue them successfully, ho-.,.ever , 
vc muct learn that every nonmilitary action in foreign policy is not an 
act of 'appenseme::>.t." 
I vould also suggest that if it bccooes clear that ve ere tending vny, 
rather than to~~ds, a general var, ve profit from long years of experience, 
and place greater reliance on the Marine Corps as the military force to 
support our diplomacy in foreign policy. In onying this , I am fully avnrc 
of the basic need for a multi-service fighting force in I:l.odern varfare. We 
shnre I know, a great pride in the V~rines and believe them capable of 
extraordinary feats . But ve muot admit that the Corps has not yet rend r d 
the Aro;y, Navy and Air Force obsolete . 
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Nevertheless , I still believe that the proper vay to fight "brush 
fires" in various parts of the vorld is not vith the forces trained for 
general warfare , but vith the specially trained self- sustaining, combat-
ready forces of the Marine Corps. No other military group is so vell 
suited to immediate service in any part of the world. No other group is 
more competent to keep the expenditure of force close to the requirements 
for achieving limited objectives. 
Finally, I vant to say that the most important element in the preser-
vation of the principle of civilian control of American Foreign Policy is 
to require that our civilian foreign policy officials take full responsi -
bility for decisions affecting foreign policy. 
Your share in maintaining the proper role of the military in foreign 
policy is, it seems to me , to keep in mind that every action you take in -
your official capacities has a bearing on the foreign relations of the 
nation. You uill either contribute to the safety and well-being of the 
Uni ted Stntes or you will detract fron it; you cannot be neutral . And if 
you ;.rould contribute to :ii; , as - !·now you wish to do, then you will maintain 
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hish en£ of patriotic nd prof onl ibi it~ i t 
fulfi l.oent of your dutie" . You \:ill f od y ur per o 
in your prof s ion by understanding your pnrt in th p r:;pccti v of th 
Corp&, in the larger perspective of the Arm-d S rvic ~ , nd in th per pee-
tivc of the total interests of our country . 
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